An AWS partner, rebuilt around how AWS actually sellsDiagnosis, a fixed-price offer catalog, a sales playbook and the path to Premier.

Where allOps stood

allOps had what most partners would envy: engineers AWS trusts, a reference list with serious international names, and an entry offer that customers liked. That entry offer was free, like the entry offer of every other AWS partner. Much of the paid work reached allOps through other partners and one-off referrals, and work billed through someone else is not credited to you inside AWS.

How we found out what was really going on

We started before the contract, with a 60-question questionnaire, and after it a review of the whole partner and sales process, from the first call to the proposal. The internal picture was clear enough, but we did not want to fix allOps only from the inside, so we went outside.

We talked to people at AWS, to customers, to partners and to deals that went elsewhere. An AWS account manager raised the same open question the founders had: how a partner gets paid once the migration is done. He also confirmed that the work comes through relationships with people at AWS, and AWS does not hand out leads. A conversation on the AWS partner side changed the plan more than anything else. Funding is unlocked by competencies, and allOps could earn those at its current tier. Chasing a higher status first would have been the wrong order.

So the order changed. Competencies went first, with a map of what each one unlocks in funding and in visibility with AWS teams. One of them, AI, had been put on hold inside allOps. We recommended bringing it back, and the team did.

What we corrected along the way

Several things that looked right on paper did not survive contact with the market, and we changed them.

• The free offer was being sold with the claim that it was worth more than everyone else's free offer. Nobody believes that claim, so we replaced it with proof the customer can hold: the report they get, what it gives them, and who does the work.
• The existing case studies had been written to pass competency audits, anonymous and technical. They proved compliance and sold nothing. We wrote a standard for real ones, with named customers who agreed, and started rewriting them.
• Funding kept drifting into the lead message. The founders did not want to be chosen for money any premier partner can offer, so the message moved to what the customer actually pays once funding is applied, invoiced once.
• A slogan about outworking everyone came off the homepage. From the Balkans to an international buyer it reads as a bidding war over hours. It became "One team for everything you run on AWS".
• "Multi-cloud" confused people who read it as a choice of clouds. The message became migration from any source to AWS.
• Prices did not go on the website in the first round. The fixed price and the outcome are agreed before signature, in the conversation, where they belong.

What we built

• Diagnosis: a 60-question questionnaire, a review of the whole partner and sales process, outside interviews and a written synthesis of findings.
• A catalog of fixed-price services, each built so AWS funding covers part and the customer pays the rest, with the price and the outcome agreed before signature.
• A sales playbook, qualification criteria with clear reasons to say no, a win-back plan for past customers and battle cards for AWS teams.
• A map of competencies and funds, with the path to Premier status, step by step.
• Website work: an offers hub with a page for every offer, topic clusters and articles, FAQs, and a rebuilt homepage.
• A presentation pack built from how customers actually buy: they ask for a PDF in the email, so every segment and offer got its own document.
• Visibility: case studies, a 90-day content plan, a founder LinkedIn program, a newsletter to AWS teams and materials for events and AWS meetings.

From plan to the team running it

The plan was built in phases. The first went into diagnosis, offers and the sales system. The second brought the website, case studies and the newsletter. The third is about execution, and the CEO set the goal for it himself: a go-to-market that runs without him in every meeting.

That is why the materials were taken into the system the team already works in, and why a new person on the allOps team took over the go-to-market role and the conversations with new companies. The CEO took the go-to-market plan to AWS teams in Madrid, and the work with them continues on the same footing. We are still there, now mostly supporting outreach, content and the rebrand, while the decisions sit with allOps.

Why this is the result for now

The engagement is ongoing, and we are not publishing a revenue result. What is already true is that allOps sells from a catalog of fixed-price offers, qualifies deals against written criteria, has a plan for every competency it needs, and has a team that runs the go-to-market on its own.